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make the vessel seaworthy by the start of 
the voyage. ld. (citing Atlantic Richfield, 
640 F.2d at 761-62). 
Because the Fifth Circuit found that 
Deutsche Shell did not exercise due 
diligence in maintaining its radar, it 
declined to decide whether a general 
average act occurred and whether the issue 
was properly raised in the proceeding. 
Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at 469. The court 
upheld the district court's conclusion that 
Deutsche Shell failed to exercise due 
diligence to maintain the vessel's radar in 
seaworthy conditions. I d. at 470. The court 
held that the radar failed because of water 
incursion resulting from Deutsche Shell's 
lack of maintenance. ld. at 472. The court 
cited the district court's fmdings that no 
repair log was kept and the antenna array 
was never removed and overhauled despite 
the manufacturer's recommendation that 
an overhaul be performed every two years. 
Id. at 471. The antenna cover which is 
exposed to harsh weather conditions 
becomes porous after time, allowing water 
seepage. ld. After the accident, a 
technician boarded the vessel to repair the 
radar system. Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at 
4 71. His report indicated signs of water 
damage. Id. After extensive study, all 
evidence pointed to water incursion as a 
cause of the radar failure. ld. at 472. The 
court noted that Deutsche Shell would 
have discovered all of the radar system's 
problems had it performed a routine 
overhaul. Id. at 473. 
The circuit court, contrary to the 
district court, did fmd evidence that the 
T /R Cell had been replaced within its 
useful life expectancy. Id. Nonetheless, 
the court held that the water incursion, 
resulting from Deutsche Shell's lack of 
maintenance, caused the radar to fail and 
was sufficient to support Placid's judgment. 
Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at 473. 
Deutsche Shell contended that even 
if there was a lack of due diligence in 
maintaining the radar, such inaction did 
not proximately cause the grounding of the 
vessel as the district court concluded. ld. at 
473-74. The court rejected this argument, 
fmding that the river flood state and the 
pilot's decision to anchor because of the 
two failed radar units were sufficiently 
foreseeable events. I d. at 4 7 4. The court 
noted that grounding is the risk a vessel 
faces when operating without an adequate 
radar system. ld. 
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Seventh Circuit holds that admiralty jurisdiction extends to tortious acts only if the 
alleged act (1) occurred "on the navigable waters of the United States," (2) created 
"a potential hazard to maritime commerce," and (3) was "substantially related to 
traditional maritime activity." Federal admiralty jurisdiction extends to a claim 
alleging that the negligent installation of pile clusters on a navigable waterway of 
the United States caused substantial damage on land far from the waterway and 
resulted in the closing of the waterway. Seventh Circuit holds that a corporate 
shipowner's liability is limited to the owner's interest in the vessel under the 
Limitation Act for damages resulting from the acts of purely ministerial employees, 
but is not limited when a managerial employee personally participates in the 
negligent act. 
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FACTS: On April 13, 1992, a breach 
occurred in the roof of a freight delivery 
tunnel below the Chicago River. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Water flooded the tunnel and tunnel 
system located throughout downtown 
Chicago, resulting in damage to some of 
the buildings connected to the tunnel 
system. Id. Business was disrupted in 
downtown Chicago for several days and 
because the Captain of the Port of Chicago 
ordered the river closed near the tunnel 
rupture, maritime traffic was disrupted for 
more than a month. ld. Thereafter, the 
City of Chicago ("City"), individuals, and 
businesses filed suit in the Cook County 
Circuit Court against Great Lakes Dredge 
& Dock Company ("Great Lakes"), alleging 
that Great Lakes' negligent installation of 
pile clusters near the Kinzie Street Bridge 
in the Chicago River caused the tunnel 
breach and resulting flood. Id. 
Claiming· federal admiralty 
jurisdiction, Great Lakes filed a three­
count complaint in the District Court for 
the Northern District of illinois on October 
6, 1992. Id. Great Lakes sought 
exoneration from or limitation of liability 
pursuant to the Limitation of Vessel 
Owner's Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 
App. U.S.C.A §§ 181-96 (West 1993), and 
requested contribution or indemnity from 
the City for any damages which Great 
Lakes might be adjudged liable. Great 
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 226. Great Lakes 
maintained that the City was responsible 
for the flooding "either because it failed to 
disclose to Great Lakes the existence of 
the tunnel near the Kinzie Street Bridge 
or because it failed to adequately repair 
and maintain the tunnel." Id. 
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. ("Grubart"), 
a downtown business which allegedly 
suffered flood damage, and the City filed a 
motion to dismiss Great Lakes' complaint 
6 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), or in the alternative, for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. The 
district court granted the motions and 
Great Lakes appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
!d. 
ISSUES: (a) Did the district court err in 
concluding that federal admiralty 
jurisdiction does not extend to a claim 
alleging that the negligent installation of 
pile clusters on a navigable waterway of the 
United States caused substantial damage 
on land far from the waterway and resulted 
in the closing of the waterway? 
(b) Did the district court err in 
dismissing a corporate shipowner's claim 
under the Limitation of Vessel Owner's 
Liability Act for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted before 
determining which corporate employees, if 
any, were negligent? 
ANALYSIS: (a) The Seventh Circuit 
began by noting that admiralty jurisdiction 
over torts was originally determined by the 
"locality" (or "situs") test. Id. at 227. The 
court stated that "[u]nder this test, 'every 
species of tort, however occurring, and 
whether on board a vessel or not, if upon 
the high seas or navigable waters, is of 
admiralty cognizance.'" Great Lakes, 3 F.3d 
at 227 (quoting The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 
Wall.) 20, 36 (1865)). The court further 
observed, however, that the Supreme 
Court never held this test to be the 
determinative factor establishing admiralty 
jurisdiction. Id. The Seventh Circuit 
described a three prong test to determine 
the existence of admiralty jurisdiction 
which the Supreme Court has established 
during the previous twenty years in 
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of 
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), Foremost 
'"' 
Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 
(1982), and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 
(1990), rev'g Complaint of Sisson, 867 F.2d 
341 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J.). Great 
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 227-28. The Seventh 
Circuit stated that in order for admiralty 
jurisdiction to exist over an alleged 
negligent act, the act must have (1) 
occurred "on the navigable waters of the 
United States," (2) created· "a potential 
hazard to maritime commerce," and (3) 
been "substantially related to traditional 
maritime activity." I d. at 228. The Seventh 
Circuit first observed that the district 
court, although knowledgeable of this three 
prong test, utilized a "totality of the 
circumstances" test, set forth in Kelly v. 
Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 228. The Seventh 
Circuit stated that following Sisson, this 
established three prong test must be 
utilized, rather than the sort of policy 
analysis engaged in by the district court. 
I d. The court then applied the facts of this 
case to the three prong test and concluded 
that federal admiralty jurisdiction existed 
over this case. Id. at 230. 
(1) In addressing the "'locality'" 
requirement, the court stated that "a tort 
occurs on navigable waters when its 
"'substance and consummation" take place 
there,' even though the allegedly negligent 
act itself occurred on land." I d. at 229 
(quoting 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 172 at 
11-32 (7th ed. 1991), in turn quoting The 
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865)). The 
court held that the alleged tort occurred on 
navigable waters because Great Lakes' 
vessels operated in the navigable "channel" 
of the Chicago River, a navigable waterway 
of the United States, while installing the 
pile clusters. Id. (citing -Escanaba Co. v. 
City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 67B, 683 (1883)). 
Although Great Lakes installed the pile 
clusters outside the navigable channel, the 
court held this to be irrelevant because the 
navigable waterway extends from shore to 
7 
shore. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 229 (citing 
Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 
237 u.s. 251, 263 (1915)). 
The court next cited the Admiralty 
Extension Act, 46 App. U.S.CA § 740 
(West 1993), which provides that admiralty 
jurisdiction extends to all damage resulting 
from a vessel on navigable waters even if 
the damage occurs on land. Great Lakes, 3 
F.3d at 229. Although the respondents 
contended that Great Lakes' barges were 
not ''vessels" because they were utilized as 
stationary platforms at the time of the 
incident, the court stated "that a craft is a 
'vessel' if its purpose is to some reasonable 
degree 'the transportation of passengers, 
cargo, or equipment from place to place 
across navigable waters.'" Id . . (quoting 
Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction 
Co. , 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985)). 
Because Great Lakes engaged in such 
transportation, the court held Great Lakes' 
barges to be within that defmition. Id. 
The court further rejected the 
appellees' argument that admiralty 
jurisdiction was precluded because the area 
of damage and the passage of six months 
were "too 'remote from the negligent act.'" 
Id. (quoting Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp. , 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963)). The court 
held that the temporal proximity 
requirement was simply a "specialized rule" 
of proximate cause and the six months 
between Great Lakes' work and the 
damage was sufficiently proximate to 
invoke the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 
App. U.S.C.A § 740 (West 1993). Great 
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 229. 
(2)- Because commerce on the 
Chicago River was disrupted for more than 
a month while the river was closed, the 
court held that the alleged tort created a 
"potential hazard to maritime commerce." 
Id. at 230. The court further rejected the 
----·--·----·------ ------------------
appellees' argument that Sisson precluded 
an analysis of what actually occurred 
because here, unlike Sisson, maritime 
commerce was actually disrupted and thus 
such a counter-factual analysis was not 
necessary. Id. at 230 n.7 (citing Sisson, 
497 U.S. at 358 and Foremost, 457 U.S. at 
668). 
(3) Finally, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that when determining if an activity 
is "substantially related to traditional 
maritime activity," a court need only be 
"concerned with 'the general character of 
the activity."' Id. at 230 (quoting Sisson, 
497 U.S. at 365). Although one of the 
purposes of pile clusters is to protect 
bridges, the court held that the installation 
of pile clusters is related to maritime 
activity because pile clusters also protect 
ships when they collide with bridges and 
aid ships in navigation. Id. 
(b) The Limitation Act, 46 App. 
U.S.C.A § 183(a) (West 1993), is intended 
to shield owners from liability beyond their 
interest in the vessel for loss or damage 
incurred without the privity or knowledge 
of the ship owner. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 
230. Although the Limitation Act does not 
defme "privity or knowledge," the court 
stated that "privity or knowledge" is 
understood to be an owner's 'personal 
participation ... in the fault or negligence 
which caused or contributed to the loss or 
injury."' Id. at 231 (quoting Coryell v. 
Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943). The 
court further noted that a corporate 
shipowner's employees consist of two 
groups: corporate managers, who have 
discretionary authority, and ministerial 
employees. Id. (citing 3 Benedict on 
Admiralty§ 42 at 5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)). 
The court ruled that a corporate shipowner 
is shielded from liability for damages 
resulting from the acts of purely 
ministerial employees, but is not shielded 
from liability when a managerial employee 
personally participates in the negligent act. 
Id. (citing 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 42 at 
5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)). Because the 
record did not indicate whether the alleged 
negligent act was performed by a 
managerial or ministerial employee, the 
court held that the district court erred in 
dismissing Great Lakes' claim without 
making such a factual determination. Id. 
The court rejected the district court's 
reliance on Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379 
(7th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that the 
Limitation Act, 46 App. U.S.CA § 183(a) 
(West 1993), will not limit Great Lakes' 
liability. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 231-32. 
The court ruled that Joyce was not 
applicable to the present case because 
Joyce involved the negligent entrustment 
of an individual rather than a corporate 
shipowner. Id. at 232. Finally, the court 
ruled that the "personal contracts doctrine" 
would not prevent Great Lakes from 
utilizing the Limitation Act, 46 App. 
U.S.CA § 183(a) (West 1993), as the 
district court ruled, because the "personal 
contracts doctrine" only applied to 
contracts and this action sounded in tort. 
Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 232. 
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Japan is not an alternative forum for a judgment declaring that vessel interests 
have no right to recover general average contributions because Japan would 
automatically enforce a forum selection clause in the bill of lading and dismiss the 
action, thus providing a "clearly unsatisfactory" remedy. 
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